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FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE
IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT OF LEGAL
EDUCATION UPON THE PROFESSION
KATHAImNE

I.

T. BARTLETr*

INTRODUCTION

It is no longer appropriate to speak of "the" feminist position on a
particular issue. Feminists are those who think critically about the role gender plays in existing social, political, and legal arrangements and who are
committed to changes, of one sort or another, in these arrangements.' Because there are different ways to criticize and to improve how gender matters in our culture, there are different feminist points of view. Feminists
disagree about matters as basic as what constitutes equality. Some favor
formal equality, which compels the elimination of all types of gender-based
distinctions and practices, even those intended to help women. Others defend substantive equality approaches that use affirmative, sometimes
gender-specific, measures to remove the disadvantages of women's biological and culturally created differences. 2 These approaches can lead to quite

different results with respect to such issues as school sports teams,3 accom* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. Rnv. 829, 833 (1990).
2. The formal equality perspective is represented in such works as CYNTHIA F. EPSmIN,
DECEPTIvE DISTINCTONS: SEX, GENDER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 118-35 (1988); WENDY
KAMINER, A FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN's FLIGHT FROM EQuALIrY 11-34 (1990); Barbara A.
Brown et al., The EqualRights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisfor EqualRightsfor Women,
80 YALE L.J. 871, 888-909 (1971); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CN. L.
REv. 1, 27-42 (1975); and Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982). The substantive equality perspective, which itself has many variations, is reflected in such works as Herma H. Kay, Equality
and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WomEN's L.J. 1, 21-37 (1985); Sylvia A.
Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. R~v. 955, 1002-13 (1984); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1314-35 (1987); Mary Ann
Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 28-48 (1990-91); and Deborah L.
Rhode, Association andAssimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 124-28, 142-44 (1986). See generally KATHARINE T. BARTLEar, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY (1993)

(comparing formal equality, substantive equality, nonsubordination theory, different voice theory,
autonomy theory, and nonessentialism as feminist legal perspectives).
3. See Karen L. Tokarz, SeparateBut Unequal EducationalSports Programs: The Needfor
a New Theory of Equality, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 201, 217-40 (1985) (comparing equal
treatment and special treatment approaches to school sports teams).
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modations to pregnancy in the workplace,4 and the division of marital property,' but in their self-conscious orientation toward ending the effects of
gender disadvantage, both approaches meet my definition of feminist.
I will discuss, then, not "the" feminist perspective on the ideological
impact of legal education upon the profession, but different feminist perspectives. My focus is on two feminist perspectives that are less familiar
than the equality approaches to which I just referred: (1) the "different
voice" perspective and (2) the dominance, or nonsubordination, perspective.
I have three reasons for choosing these particular models. First, I hope to
demonstrate my point that feminists do not speak with one voice and that
there are, indeed, a variety of feminist points of view with quite different
implications and consequences. Second, these perspectives help to expose
the links between legal education and gendered ideologies in the profession
that are not easily revealed by the equality principles with which most practicing attorneys are likely to be most familiar. Finally, the juxtaposition of
these two perspectives will show how difficult reform in this area will be.
Different feminist perspectives reveal different dilemmas and disadvantages. Unfortunately, addressing one type of gender disadvantage often
tends to reinforce or aggravate another. I conclude by suggesting that progress in removing gender-based disadvantage cannot be made by law
schools alone, without corresponding changes in the legal profession.

II. DIFERENT VOICE AND DOMINANcE PERSPECrIVES
The primary commitment of different voice theory is to identify those
characteristics and values of women that are different and undervalued in
6
this society and to promote affirmatively, or revalue, those characteristics.
Unlike equality theory, which attempts to eliminate gender-based disadvantage in a world that presupposes existing values and norms, different voice
theory questions existing values and norms and contends that women have
priorities that are not only different from, but superior to, the "male" values
currently rewarded in society. 7 It questions, for example, the qualities of
individualism and privacy upon which our economic system-which values
4. See Littleton, supra note 2, at 1291-1304 (comparing different feminist approaches to
sex-specific differences).
5. See, e.g., MARTHA A. Fmmm^n,THE ILLusioN oF EQuALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALrT OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991) (rejecting formal equality approaches and advocating outcome
fairness as the guide to property distribution at divorce).
6. BARmTErr, supra note 2, at 589.
7. Id. This perspective springs from the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose book,
IN A DIFFERENr VOICE:

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WoMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982), has

strongly influenced many feminist legal theorists. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Prineron
Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 28-30 (1988); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portiain
a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J.

39, 43-55 (1985); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderationsof the Aspirations For
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individual effort, merit, and reward-is based. It also questions the individual rights orientation of our legal system, which leaves individuals alone to
care for themselves and their families. These values, according to different
voice theory, reflect male values and a male version of reality, in contrast to
female priorities that favor connections, community, and responsibility for
others. This theory supports the view that society as a whole would be
improved if women's values were more highly prized. The Family and
Medical Leave Act of 19938 is an example of a legal reform that might be
said to substitute the female-associated values of connection and community for the male-associated values of individualism and privacy because it
helps to spread the burdens of childrearing from individual family units to
the larger society. 9
Dominance, or nonsubordination, theory approaches women's differences from another direction altogether. It posits that feminists' primary
concern should not be women's differences but the imbalance of power
between men and women; women are harmed not because they are different
from men but because they are subordinated to them.'" It is this subordination, rather than different treatment per se, that dominance theorists strive to
eliminate.
Dominance theory's focus on women's subordination has broadened
into a critique of some of the most basic principles of the liberal state. It
asserts that the very principles which are supposed to guarantee objectivity,
neutrality, and justice under the law in fact reflect male interests and help to
maintain male dominance. The equality principle upon which feminists
have sought equal rights with men is one example. Because this principle
only extends to women's equal treatment to men, women are disadvantaged
as to all arrangements and settings designed primarily with men in mind.
Thus, even if women are given the same access to the same workplace as
men, they are not identically affected by such workplace features as the
"standard" forty-hour work week, tools and machines requiring employees
with "male" strength and size, and workplace safety standards that treat
Our Judges, 61 S.CAL.L. REv. 1877, 1912-14 (1988); Suzannah Sherry, Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 580-91 (1986).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (to be codified as amended in scattered titles of

U.S.C.).
9. This spreading is, to be sure, quite limited. The Act requires employers of more than 50
employees to provide only up to 12 weeks of leave without pay. Id. § 102. In contrast, other
industrialized countries have far more liberal provisions. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLNDON, ABORTION AND DIvoRcE IN WEasmRN LAW 53-54 (1987) (comparing American, French, German, and
Italian parental leave laws); Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandingsof
Work, Parenthood,and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective,81 CAL. L. REv. 531,57187 (1993) (comparing American and Italian parental leave laws).
10. See CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND T-m
LAw 40.45 (1987).
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accommodations to hazards that males face as neutral and those necessary
to protect women as special.'1
Similarly, the liberal state takes the free speech protection of the First
Amendment as a neutral and objective principle-everyone is "free" to
speak, regardless of the content of the speech, with only a few limited exceptions. According to dominance theorists, however, this neutrality is illusory, for the powerful are able to use the First Amendment to maintain the
subordination of the powerless. 2 The best example of this phenomenon is
pornography. Pornography is protected speech that defines women as
worthless except as sexual objects for the pleasure of men. This definition
cannot be countered by women, Professor Catharine MacKinnon argues,
insofar as the pornography itself has undermined the credibility of women
13
as subjects who might have something to say that is worth hearing.
Privacy is another principle that, in its purported neutrality (the law
does not single out some individuals for more or less privacy than others)
enables men to dominate women. Dominance theory emphasizes that because men have more social, economic, political, and physical power than
women, protecting privacy means leaving women subject to what men do to
them in private-which, according to Professor MacKinnon, is decidedly
non-neutral from the point of view of women. 4
There are important similarities between different voice theory and
dominance theory. In particular, each theory accepts the prominence of certain important differences between men and women, which the equal treatment model of equality does not do. These approaches part ways, however,
over the significance that should be given to those differences. Different
voice theory celebrates women's differences and, indeed, is so enthusiastic
about them that it views these differences as forming a better foundation for
law than the male values that currently predominate. Dominance theory, in
contrast, focuses on how the differences associated with women-most es11. For one of the first serious feminist examinations of how the contemporary workplace
favors men, see Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equalityfor Women: Labor Market Hostility to
Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REv. 55, 56-61 (1979). Among the many other excellent articles on
the topic are Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND.L. REv. 1183, 1186-97 (1989); Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender
Paradox and the Limitations of DiscriminationAnalysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv.79, 100-09 (1989) and Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
Work: JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregationin the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1824-43 (1990).
12. See MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 207; Mary E.Becker, The Politics of Women's
Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 489-94
(1992).
13. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornographyas Defamation and Discrimination,71 B.U.
L. RFv. 793, 811-12 (1991); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 321, 340-45 (1984).

14. See MAcKwNON, supra note 10, at 99-102.
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pecially, and not accidentally, the characteristics celebrated by different
voice theory-operate to subordinate women by limiting women's availability and inclination to compete with men in the public sphere, while en15
suring that men have someone to take care of them.
I.

INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM

The two perspectives I have described offer a number of insights about
legal education. After describing these insights, I will attempt to explain
their implications for reform.
A.

The Different Voice Critique

Different voice theory helps to identify a number of features of legal
education that might be labelled "male," and less desirable than the female
values to which they might be contrasted. First, legal education idealizes
individual performance, competitiveness, and autonomy rather than group
process, cooperation, and collective learning. Students are called on to perform in class; they compete with one another to excel; and their grades,
made competitive by grading curves, are usually based on an individual's
performance on one, single exam. Students receive few, if any, external
rewards for performances in joint problem-solving exercises or for treating
their adversaries with dignity and respect. Together, these aspects of legal
education may reinforce what is damaging and dehumanizing in the law and
in the public sphere more generally: excessive competitiveness and cutthroat individualism.16
In addition to reinforcing competitiveness and individualism, legal education rewards the ability to take any side and argue any point of view.
The assumption of our legal system is that all parties are entitled to have
their interests represented and that no one set of interests should be privi15. Id. at 38-39.
16. See Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an
Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WoMEN's L.J. 1, 41-46 (1989-90); Project-Gender,
Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and
Graduates,40 STAN. L. REv. 1209, 1238-59 (1988) [hereinafter Project-Gender,Legal Education, and the Legal Profession].
Ironically, as different voice theorists often point out, reinforcing these traits may not prepare
students well even for the world of practice, insofar as service to clients often demands that
lawyers-colleagues and opponents alike-be able to trust and work well with one another. See
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 794-829 (1984); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a
Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of Gender and Social
Change, 14 LAw & Soc. INQuIRY 289, 316 (1989) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a
Research Agenda] (suggesting that feminist lawyers' greater sensitivity to client relations will
improve their success in the conventional sense that clients will come back to them "because they
feel they are really being heard and served").
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leged over any other. Because all clients are equally entitled to the same
degree of zealous representation, the attorney must be able to argue her
client's side of a case with'zeal, whichever side that may be.17 By the same

token, legal education does not encourage any genuine empathy for, or understanding of, either side of the case. What results is the kind of zeal that
blinds rather than enlightens. Students are taught to attach themselves to
their client's cause with great enthusiasm, without the kind of genuine understanding of either client or adversary that might guide the parties to resolve disputes with the least amount of damage. 18
Complementing the stress in legal education on competition and zealous advocacy is the emphasis on adversarial appellate cases. This emphasis
serves to define the lawyering process primarily in terms of the pre-formed
"case" and undervalues the complex interactions through which lawyers
and clients work together to define and resolve problems.19 Similarly,
treating cases litigated through the appellate level as the primary texts of
legal education contributes to the devaluation of alternative, non-adversarial
methods of dispute resolution. These alternatives have been promoted by

feminists who have spoken explicitly from "a different voice," arguing that

17. For a justification of this role based on the values of individual autonomy, equality, and
diversity, see Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities,1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 615-19. Those who contemplate the ethical
dilemmas involved in the attorney's habit of advocacy see different ways of addressing these
dilemmas. Professor Anthony Kronman charges legal educators with the responsibility of providing moral education, to offset the indifference to truth generated by the advocacy role. See
Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955,
963-68 (1981). Jonathan Macey is more pessimistic about the ability of legal educators to alter
the values of instrumental reason and advocacy with which law students learn to identify in law
school. He urges, instead, that law schools focus not on morality, but on greater skepticism for the
law, so that law students understand that legal and moral positions are not the same. See Jonathan
R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the American Law School, 45 STAN.
L. R v. 1937, 1946-53 (1993).
18. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and
Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 61, 77-81 (1988);
see also Peggy C. Davis, ContextualLegal Criticism: A DemonstrationExploring Hierarchyand
"Feminine" Style, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1635, 1645-55 (1991) (explaining that an interactive, less
hierarchical lawyering style, typically associated with powerlessness and femininity, might actually improve the process of attorney representation of clients). Steven Ellman analyzes how an
ethic of care might affect ethical rules and legal practice, concluding that it would lead lawyers to
be more likely to select and represent clients in accord with their own moral principles and sense
of responsibilities and to relate more interactively with their clients. Stephen Ellman, The Ethic of
Care as an Ethicfor Lawyers, 81 GEo. L.J. 2665, 2679-2712 (1993).
19. Peggy Davis distinguishes an authoritarian, controlled style of lawyering from a more
interactive process and explains how the New York University Lawyering Process Colloquium
has tried to expand beyond the unexamined assumptions of legal education that contribute to the
dominance of the former over the latter. See Peggy C. Davis, Law and Lawyering: Legal Studies
With an Interactive Focus, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 185, 189-90 (1992).
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legal education has focused too much on face-to-face, adversarial combat
and too little on avoiding conflict."
The emphasis on appellate cases also reinforces abstract reasoning
processes over factually rich contextual ones. From the different voice perspective, more attention should be given to contextual reasoning, through
which a rule's exceptions and qualifications might be discovered. This in
turn would loosen up the predetermined scripts from which abstract legal
principles are derived. 2 Contextual reasoning also helps to soften the entrenched dichotomies between reason and emotion, objectivity and subjectivity, and mind and body-dichotomies that alienate law students and
distort and impoverish the quality of legal thought and learning.2 2
B.

The Dominance Theory Critique

Dominance theory provides a basis for attack on legal education that
both builds on and departs sharply from the insights of different voice theory. It agrees that conventional legal reasoning methodologies are too abstract and limiting. The implications of this critique for dominance
theorists, however, are not the same as those drawn by different voice theo-

rists. According to different voice theorists, legal reasoning is improved by
greater contextualization, which enhances the possibilities for compassion
and innovative decisionmaking. Dominance theorists view the issue in
more substantive (or "political") terms. From the dominance perspective,
the problem with abstract legal decisionmaking is not the loss of opportunities for richer contextualized dispute resolution per se, but the fact that the
20. Carrie Menkel-Meadow's work has been especially important on this point. See, e.g.,
Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda, supra note 16, at 315; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 18, at 80; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 61.
Not all feminists have supported nonadversarial dispute resolution techniques. Especially
with respect to divorce-related issues, many women's advocates have expressed concern that mediation disadvantages women because it exploits their willingness, and high incentives, to compromise. Battered women are the most vulnerable. See Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of
Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REv. 2117, 2157-71
(1993); Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1561-62 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 81-97 (1984); Lenore J.
Weitzman, GenderDifferences in Custody Bargainingin the UnitedStates, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENcEs OF DiVORCE: THE INTERNATIONAL PERsPECrrvE 395, 405 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis
Maclean eds., 1992). Recent research has put into question the severity of some of these concers. See Jessica Pearson, Ten Myths About Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 279, 283-89 (1993)
(concluding that research does not support the claim that mediation disadvantages women).
21. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 1, at 849-63; Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "A", 70 Tax.
L. REv. 971, 971-85 (1992); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 18, at 77-81; Margaret J. Radin, The
Pragmatistand the Feminist,63 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1699, 1724-25 (1990); Catharine Wells, Situated
Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1727, 1742-46 (1990).
22. See Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1775-79 (1993).
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particular, concrete abstractions produced within the current legal regime
represent and maintain male dominance. These abstractions are not undesirable because they are abstractions, but because, in this current social order, they are derived from male scripts that impose male-serving standards
23
of what is reasonable, consensual, and objective.
Dominance theory's critique of objectivity and neutrality provides another line of analysis that might be aimed at legal education. Law schools
teach what they understand the law to be-rational, objective, and neutral.
If this understanding is flawed or, worse, a cover for particular interests the
law in fact represents, law schools themselves might be said to be complicit
in the law's imposition of male dominance and female subordination.2'

Dominance theory also provides a basis for an attack on the organization and contents of the traditional law school curriculum. This curriculum
feeds male dominance by maintaining a hierarchy between a core set of
courses in business and finance-affecting mostly men-and a set of more

optional, "fringe" courses such as family law, employment discrimination,
and even legal ethics-in which women are more likely to be interested.2"

Note that this is a point about power, not values. While different voice
theory might be concerned about cultural norms-i.e., how a heavily business-dominated, litigation-centered curriculum reinforces competition and
individualism over cooperation and group responsibility-dominance the23. See CATARD;E A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FmmiNsT THEORY OF THE STATE 162-64
(1989); see also MAcKINNON, supra note 10, at 234 n.27 (describing the "mechanistic quality" of
legal thinking). Many feminists have called for more contextualized legal reasoning, using insights from dominance theory to demonstrate how new scripts can help challenge male dominance. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories,79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1051 (1991).
One of the best examples of applied scholarship in this area is Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
24. The adversarial, accusatory tone conveyed in this sentence is characteristic of some dominance theory. See, e.g., MAcKINNON, supra note 10, at 204-05 (accusing of "collaboration" women lawyers who defend pornography on First Amendment principles). I discuss this point at
Bartlett, supra note 1, at 876-77.
25. Women's greater interest in ethical issues has been demonstrated in the context of law
practice by Lloyd Burton et al., Feminist Theory, ProfessionalEthics, and Gender-Related Distinctionsin Attorney Negotiating Styles, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 199, 244. On the role of law school
curriculum in gender discrimination, see Nancy S. Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses:
Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101, 103-05 (1988).
Feminists have shown how the privileging of legal issues affecting mostly men over issues
affecting mostly women operates throughout the legal system. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the FederalCourts, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1682,
1739-50 (1991) (explaining how federal jurisdiction rules exclude cases involving "domestic relations" and other issues that disproportionately affect women). This hierarchy builds on the public/
private dichotomy, which feminists informed by dominance theory have identified as a central
component to the law's participation in female subordination. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The
Familyand the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1498-99
(1983); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in
THE PoLrncs OF LAW: A PRoGI.EssvE CRmQuE 151 passim (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990).
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ory is concerned with how the structure of a curriculum might itself become
a means by which male dominance is obscured and perpetuated. The
marginalization of women in law school textbooks and in the topics covered
in law school courses2 6 is, likewise, seen as a different issue for each group
of theorists. Different voice theorists worry about the primacy of the dominant but inferior "male" values; dominance theorists focus on how the appearance or disappearance of women in legal texts is a means of male
control and female subordination.'
Dominance theory also provides some insight into the climate issues
associated with legal education. Abundant evidence exists that women are
disadvantaged by law school pedagogies. A questionnaire administered to
law students at the University of California at Berkeley in March 1988, for
example, found that men are almost twice as likely to ask questions in class,
volunteer in class, and ask questions of their professors after class. 28 These
results were duplicated in studies at Stanford and Yale law schools.2 9 In the
Berkeley study, women students reported lower levels of self-esteem and a
steeper decline in confidence since coming to law school than that experienced by men. And although the women studied entered law school with
LSAT scores and grades not significantly lower than those of men, the men
examined received a significantly larger proportion of the highest grades.3"
Finally, fifty-one percent of women students, as compared to twenty percent of male students, reported pressure to set aside their own values in
order to think like a lawyer.3 Similar gender differences have been identifled among practicing attorneys.3 2
What explains these findings? Different voice theory emphasizes the
gap between women's sharing, community-focused values and the competitive atmosphere and abstract "male" values prevalent in legal education. It
provides a perspective on how legal education may alienate women by reflecting values not their own. Dominance theory moves beyond this explanation to the structural advantages these differences give to men. It
26. See Erickson, supra note 25, at 103-05; Judith Resnik, Gender Bias: From Classes to
Courts, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2195, 2198 (1993).
27. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts

Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065, 1074-75 (1985).
28. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 28, 50.
29. See Project-Gender,Legal Education, and the Legal Profession,supra note 16, at 1239,
1242; Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L.

REv. 1299, 1335-45 (1988).
30. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 51.
31. Id. at 52.
32. See RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: Tm
78, 188-90 (1989) (explaining, for exam-

CHANGING VALUEs OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 73,

ple, that a female attorney is far more likely to disclose a letter demonstrating that her client is less
fit to have custody of a child).
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underlines how the features of legal education outlined above allocate rewards based on rules that disadvantage women and reinforce male
dominance.
Studies of higher education lend some support to this more conspiratorial analysis. A study commissioned by the Association of American University Women, for example, documents a host of behaviors by professors
that suppress women's self-esteem and thereby weaken their performance
levels.3 3 Professors make eye contact with men more often than with women, 34 so that individual male students are more likely to feel recognized
and encouraged to participate in class. Professors use tones and postures
with male students that communicate interest, which are not similarly employed with female students (for example, leaning forward when men speak
while adopting a patronizing tone and inattentive posture, e.g., looking at
the clock, when talking to women). Professors are also more likely to call
on men than women; call men by name; credit comments to male students;
probe a male student's response to a question for a fuller answer requiring a
higher level of critical thinking; wait longer for a man to answer before
going on to another student; interrupt female students; give a longer and
more complete answer to male students; and write stronger recommendation letters for male students.3"
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite their divergences, each of the above perspectives offers a useful vantage point for thinking about the gender implications of legal education. Taken separately, they highlight specific aspects of legal education
and suggest how legal education might support ideologies that make gender
matter. Taken together, they demonstrate how difficult the problem of improving these gender implications will be. I will conclude by noting three
specific difficulties in contemplating a feminist reform agenda for legal
education.
The first difficulty is that changes in legal education that seek to promote "women's values" tend to reinforce women's identification with qualities, such as cooperativeness and caring for others, that have been used
historically to keep women subordinate to men. This is Professor MacKinnon's complaint with different voice theory: To the extent the glorification
of women's values reinforces those qualities that have historically made
women different-members of the support cast rather than leaders and initiators-women risk falling deeper into the age-old trap upon which the sys33. See ROBERTA M. HALL & BERNICE R. SANDLER, THE CLASSROOM CLIMATE: A CHILLY
ONE FOR WOMEN? (1982).

34. Id. at 7.
35. Id. at 7-11.
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tem of male dominance depends.3 6 To avoid this trap, the revaluation of
traditionally female values must proceed by breaking the link between these
values and the gender of those who hold them.
The second difficulty is that special attention to women's interests, as
defined under either different voice or dominance theory, tends to reinforce
the idea that women are different from the (male) norm. This phenomenon,
known as the "difference dilemma,"3 7 is illustrated through such "special"
women's activities and accommodations as women's law student organizations, attention to women in the admissions process, women's law journals,
special awards for women, and representation by women on particular committees and boards. Each of these women-centered activities or practices
parallels a similar phenomenon in the legal profession itself. Under strict
equality-based approaches, or at least an equal treatment approach, these
measures are, on balance, undesirable, in that they reinforce difference and
stigmatization based on gender. If one accepts the critique that legal education is based on "male values," however-as different voice theorists
would contend-or preserves male dominance-as dominance theorists
would insist-one could argue that the law and law schools are already
organized to accommodate men's interests. Thus, some reordering appears
to be justified-not to favor women, but to neutralize the male bias and
interests.
Finally, there is the problem of how law schools can best prepare students for the world they are to enter, which is still a very male world. It
might be said that the more that is done in legal education either to reflect
women's values better or to protect women from male dominance, the less
prepared women will be for the male world of legal practice that awaits
them. Pursuing this line of thought, it is bad enough that women have to
face this bias39 and the burdens of their imagined, as well as their genuine,
36. See MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 38-39; Joan C. Williams, DeconstructingGender, 87
MICH. L. REv. 797, 836-40 (1989).
37. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990).
38. In the only United States Supreme Court decision addressing the constitutionality of "benign" sex-based discrimination in the educational setting, the Court followed an equal treatment
approach and invalidated the discrimination. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
39. Gender bias studies show that women attorneys face bias in law practice on the part of
litigants, other attorneys, and judges. Judges, for example, give less weight to the arguments of
female lawyers than to those of male lawyers and are more likely to cut them off when they are
speaking in court. See, e.g., MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMMrIrEE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
JoINT COMMrITEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 260 (1989) (60% of female litigators reported
that judges often or sometimes appear to give less weight to female attorneys' arguments than to
those of male attorneys); NINTH Cmcurr GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, THE PRELIMINARY REPORT
52-53 (Discussion Draft 1992) (40% of female attorneys report that judges cut off the arguments
of women counsel while allowing men more time). The Maryland and Ninth Circuit judicial bias
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differences.40 It would be unfortunate, indeed, if in attempting to correct a
systemic problem in which men and their values predominate, law schools
further undermined women's capacities to compete in a male world.
One conference participant articulated a version of this problem when
he asked members of the panel how a law partner should handle case assignments in his firm when he knows that a judge is biased against female
attorneys. Should the partner act on, and thereby perpetuate, the judge's
bias or should that bias be ignored even though, as a result, the judge may
act to the client's detriment? The question illustrates how the problems law
schools face in eliminating, or at least reducing the effects of, gendered
ideologies are replicated in law practice itself. We can say, as has the
Supreme Court, that acting upon certain biases of others is impermissible.4 1
But to act as if these biases did not exist hurts other parties-in this case,
clients-to whom we owe a very high duty. We must, of course, always
question whether imagined bias is real. But to the extent the gender bias
identified by feminists is genuine, so must be the concerns about how transition costs of eliminating that bias should be distributed between clients
and lawyers.
If there is an answer to this difficult problem, it is unlikely that either
law schools or law firms can find it on their own. Law firms cannot be
expected to resocialize new attorneys whose training reinforces the kind of
"male" ideologies feminist theory has identified, nor can law schools make
a dent in the gendered ideologies of legal practice if the practice remains
determinedly "male." This conference, although its goals are modest, is a
rare opportunity for the kind of mutual exchange about the relation between
gender and the law-as learned both in law schools and in law practiceon which the successful, and necessarily incremental, reshaping of
gendered ideologies depends.

studies, and several others reporting similar phenomena, are discussed in Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on GenderBias in
the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 247-51 (1993), and Resnik, supra note 26, at 2199-2209.
40. Carol Rose has used game theory to explain how even when individual women rise above
stereotypes, the expectations that they are, say, less aggressive than men works against them in the
negotiation setting. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property, Gainingand Losing Ground,78 VA. L.
Rev. 421, 423 (1992). In addition, commentators have pointed out that women are penalized not
only for not being aggressive enough, but for being too aggressive in situations in which men
would not be so judged. See RosABEm M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION
201-02, 208 (1977) (explaining that a group which constitutes less than 15% of an organization is
particularly vulnerable to stereotyping); Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy
Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REv. 89, 92-104 (1990).
41. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (holding that the racial bias of others
cannot be taken into account by a court in deciding the custody of a child whose mother is in an
interracial marriage).

